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America as Pattern
and Problem
by Carl E. Schneider

Let us look to America, not in order to make a servile copy ofthe institutions that she
has established, but to gain a clearer view ofthe polity that will be the best for us; let us
look there less to find examples than instruction; let us borrow from her the principles,
rather than the details, ofher laws. The laws ofthe French republic may be, and ought
to be in many cases, different from those which govern the United States; but the principles on which the American constitutions rest, those principles oforder, ofthe balance of
powers, of true liberty, ofdeep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to all . . . .
-Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America

S

ince the days of Tocqueville, foreign observers have seen America
as both a pattern and a problem.
They still do, and in ways that illuminate the way law deals with bioethical
issues both here and abroad. America
was long exceptional in having a written
constitution, in allowing its courts the
power of judicial review, and in letting
courts exercise that power to develop
and enforce principles of human rights.
Today, that pattern looks markedly less
exceptional. After the Second World
War, Germany and Japan were persuaded to adopt constitutions that included
human rights provisions and that endowed courts with the power to interpret them. Since that time, a number of
other countries-Canada, for example-have also moved closer to the
American constitutional pattern.
Many countries, however, have not
been content to borrow American constitutional principles and practices.
Their courts have also asserted their authority to develop and enforce principles of human rights in two other ways.
First, courts in many countries have assumed jurisdiction over questions in-

volving those rights by virtue of their
duty to interpret treaties their countries
have signed. Second, and strikingly,
courts in many countries have come to
see themselves as joint participants in
the work of building an international
body of human rights law. As my colleague Christopher McCrudden writes
in his fascinating study of this development, "It is now commonplace for
courts in one jurisdiction to refer extensively to the decision of other courts in
interpreting human-rights guarantees." 1
This is where America has come to
seem a problem to our foreign observers. For the United States has been
irritatingly reluctant to sign these
treaties, and American courts have been
irritatingly unwilling to consult the decisions of foreign courts. Why?
The reasons are-obviously-various. Foreign observers are not infrequently pleased to believe that Americans are irredeemably provincial. (What
do you call someone who speaks two
languages? Bilingual. What do you call
someone who speaks one language?
American.) And it is perfectly true that,
while lawyers in many countries are

likely to have had some instruction in a
foreign law (and even to have studied in
a foreign country-often the United
States), American lawyers have generally
not been so blessed. To be sure, Americans lawyers have less need. They work
in the world's dominant economic
power, one so vast that much more internal trade occurs within American
boundaries than within any other industrialized country. American lawyers,
to put the point differently, are more
narrowly trained because-more than
the lawyers in other countries-they
can afford to be.
Foreign observers also relish suggesting that America has resisted signing
some international human rights
treaties because it is hopelessly arrogant
and cannot believe it has anything to
learn about human rights from abroad.
It is surely true that American foreign
policy has in recent decades often
seemed loftily confident of its mission
to bring the wretched heathen to the
human rights light. But the reluctance
to sign such treaties has other, less evident, roots as well. For one thing, a
number of international human rights
agreements have grown out of regional
(and particularly European) efforts at
economic and political integration, efforts in which the United States has
been, if anything, a competitor. More
significantly, however, the government
of the United States is-more than almost any foreign country's-federal.
We confide many issues with human
rights implications to the states, not the
federal government. In addition, some
Americans have opposed these treaties
because they take them seriously
enough to be uneasy about where judicial interpretation will take their proviSions.
That the American executive and
legislative branches have not leapt to endorse human rights treaties may help
explain why American judges have not
felt encouraged to be guided by the developing international law of human
rights that judges in many countries are
creating. But two other factors are probably even more significant. First, the
ethos of the American law stubbornly
retains its common law inspiration,
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while Europeans still find their inspiration in civil law. This matters because
the attempt to evolve a body of international human rights law-in practice if
not in necessity-seems more consonant with the civil law than the common law.
The common law grew out of the
decisions of English judges in particular
cases, while the civil law looks to general principles of law embodied in codes
that are supposed to be systematic. The
common law approach as Americans
understand it is experimental, flexible,
and pragmatic; it is of this time and of
that place. It seeks to discover through
social experiment what programs and
practices in fact work for us here today.
That is why Brandeis' description of the
states as laboratories of democracy still
appeals to us and why we still remember
that Holmes said that the life of the law
is not logic, it is experience.
Proponents of civil law, on the other
hand, with their allegiance to general
principle, are more readily charmed by
abstraction and broad assertions of
principle. This difference in attitude has
for some years been exemplified for me
by an exchange I had with one of my
German students. We had been discussing a nuisance case in which the
court had sided with a plaintiff who had
"come to the nuisance." My student
protested that this violation of one of
the common law's undoubted aphorisms made the law "incoherent." I suggested that it nevertheless made for
good social policy. I could hardly have
distressed her more. The law, she asseverated, must above all be a set of coherent principles. I was pleased to be able
to quote Goethe in my defense, which
in Germany usually ends discussions:
"Grau, theurer Freund, ist aile Theorie,
und Griin des Lebens Goldner Baum"
(Gray, dear friend, is all theory, and
green life's golden tree). But she remained unappeased and even horrified
at the common law's betrayal of the idea
of legal integrity.
The civilians' taste for grand theory,
their thirst for universal, timeless truths,
perhaps explains how so much of the
legal world can tolerate what to unreconstructed common lawyers look susjanuary-February 2000

piciously like natural law ideas embodied in contemporary treaties and the judicial opinions of many countries in
human rights cases. When the common
lawyer hears the kinds of expressions
common in the defense of these treaties
and opinions, when, for instance, the
common lawyer is admonished to protect "human dignity," Jeremy Bentham's
jibe springs irrepressibly to mind-that
natural law is "nonsense on stilts."
"Nonsense on stilts" rings true to
common lawyers because they believe,
again with Holmes, that general propositions do not decide concrete cases,
that vague expressions of vast principles
can be interpreted so variously that they
neither instruct nor constrain judges,
that natural law incorporates more
rhetoric than reason. Postmodernism,
structuralism, and their ilk appeal not at
all to American judges, but they know
vacuity when they see it. The "right of
individual self-determination" is no
doubt a fine thing, but what does it tell
you, for example, about how implacable
a duty of informed consent to impose
on doctors?
This leads me to what must in this
cramped space be our last reason American judges have not swarmed to join
their European-and even Commonwealth-brethren in building a common law of human rights. The common law gives judges extraordinary liberty to make law. But only in some
areas, and only subject to the untrammeled review of legislatures. Ultimately,
as we understand the common law tradition, it is democratic. How, we ask, is
it democratically decent to hand over
lawmaking power to unelected judges
guided not by policy electorally established, not by their understanding of
their own people's law and tradition,
but by what they and their upper middle class confreres from abroad think
true at the end of the twentieth century?
These questions about the role of
unelected judges in a democracy have
been honed to biting sharpness in the
United States by our constitutional history. Through the New Deal, that was a
history of judicial reaction. In recent
decades, the direction of judicial activism has shifted, but in ways that have

provoked vehement and tumultuous
dissent, as the words "Roe v. Wade" suffice to remind us. This (probably unanticipated) response and the changes in
judicial personnel that the response has
helped inspire have made the Supreme
Court leery of expansive interpretations
even of our o~n Constitution, much
less of developing an international law
of human rights that might lead the
Court into who knows what thickets of
brambles and briars. The Court's latest
encounter with human rights in a
bioethical context-the assisted suicide
cases--exemplifies just this caution. In
those cases the Court declined to articulate any broadly phrased right, postponed further decision until more empirical evidence grows out of experience, and saluted the virtues of decisions reached by state legislatures. The
United States thus seems fated to remain-as it has long been-both pattern and problem.
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